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BOOK REVIEWS
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY. Some Case Studies. New
York: MacMillan Co., 1950, pp. x, 588. $4.75. Edited by Walter Adams.*
The Structure of American Industry, in the words of Professor Walter
Adams, editor of the collection of industry studies published under this title,
"is designed to present a representative, comprehensive and up-to-date view
of American industry-its diverse forms of market structure and multi-
farious types of market behavior."' To accomplish the designated objective,
twelve economists and a lawyer contributed studies written in accordance with
a common plan. Each discussed the origin and development of an industry,
characteristics of its market and price policy, and public policy questions posed
by its structure and behavior. These industry studies each comprise a single
chapter: I) cotton textiles, "which, until recently, closely approximated the
model of 'pure' competition"; II) bituminous coal, "in which competition has
often degenerated to the cut-throat level"; III) agriculture, "which is competi-
tive only within the limits permitted by a government price-support program";
IV) residential construction, "which illustrates market organization ranging
from monopolistic competition to local monopoly"; V) steel; VI) chemicals;
VII) cigarettes; VIII) motion pictures, "which show the functioning of
various types of oligopoly"; IX) fluid mnilk, "which evidences elements of
oligopoly, bilateral monopoly and government price fixing"; X) tin cans,
"which approach a duopoly structure"; XI) glass containers, "which until
very recently, were the prime example of patent monopoly"; XII) ocean
shipping; and XIII) air transport, "which exemplify the operation of regu-
lated industries."
2
The industries studied have given rise to public policy questions that
have been aired in legislative hearings, before regulatory agencies and in
litigation. Notwithstanding their synoptic character, these single-chapter
studies do illuminate some aspects of the problems involved in anti-trust cases.
For example, the chapter on the bituminous coal industry discusses depressed
industry conditions leading to the Appalachian Coals case' and the Bituminous
Coal Act.4 The chapter on the chemicals industry considers problems of size,
integration and inter-industry cooperation which have been set forth in various
cases involving cartels, patent pooling and other manifestations of collusion
among some of the largest corporations in the country. The chapter on steel,
* Professor of Economics, Michigan State University.
1. P. v.
2. Ibid.
3. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
4. 50 STAT. 72 (1937), as amended, 55 STAT. 134 (1941).
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with its discussion of size and integration and summary of the arguments for
and against the basing point system of pricing considers the issues involved
in the Columbia Steel' and Cement6 cases. Chapters on motion picture and
cigarette industries bring economic analysis to bear on the problem of
oligopoly and "conscious parellelism" with which the court was concerned in
the Interstate Circuit7 and second American Tobacco8 cases.
The structure of American industry as outlined in these studies appears
to fall into three broad divisions: competitive, oligopolistic, and monopolistic.
In the competitive, "unsatisfactory results of free market pricing" have
brought about governmental intervention; in the oligopolistic, drastic reorgani-
zation is urged in the interest of competition; and in the monopolistic, public
regulation is imperative.
Professor Adams' views, however, are not set forth most forcefully in
the one chapter-a study of the steel industry-contributed by him; nor are
they strongly presented in the editorial comment on the chapters contributed
by his associates. They are, however, set forth in some detail in the Hearings
before the Subcommittee on study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. On appearing before the
Subcommittee, Professor Adams announced the forth-coming publication
of The Structure of American Industry, and called attention to "a concentra-
tion of economic power unparalleled in our history." 9 The trend toward
concentration, "accelerated in recent years," had brought about a state of
affairs which could only be dealt with by governmental action, to wit :"o
In industry after industry, a handful of concerns enjoy an exclusive
position or are sufficiently dominant so as "to enforce conformity
among their smaller competitors. Whether we turn to steel or
aluminum, to automobiles or petroleum, to motion pictures or
cigarettes, to chemicals or tin cans, there is the same sad tale of over-
whelming size and entrenchment in strategic economic position ...
What we are confronted with today is technically referred to as
oligopoly which denotes a type of market structure where a few
sellers are dominant. Under this type of market organization, the
entry of newcomers is effectively barred, deterred-not so much by
the threat of economic reprisals as by the size and entrenched power
of existing firms. Under oligopoly, moreover, a seller no longer can
afford to be independent in pursuing a given price policy. He must,
of necessity, take the reaction of his rivals into account. Thus a firm
knows that price-cutting will inevitably cause its large competitors to
follow suit with the result that the market is shared as it was be-
fore-only at a lower level of prices and profits. It is this certainty
that price cuts will eventually be met, it is this fear of retaliation, that
5. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
6. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
7. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
8. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
9. Hearings before House Subcommittee on Study of Monwpoly Power of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1949).
10. Id. at 338.
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leads to conservative and nonagressive price policies in our oligopo-
listic industries.
The "basic policy of the government must be one of coping with the
fundamental problem of size-horizontal, vertical, conglomerate,"'" Professor
Adams told the Committee. Though "more vigorous enforcement of our
antitrust laws and the imposition of stiffer penalties"12 would be helpful in
dealing with the monopoly problem, something more was needed. The problem
of excessive size, he maintained, might better be dealt with by an administra-
tive commission using a "case by case approach" on an experimental basis.3
At the committee chairman's request, 14 Professor Adams drafted a proposed
statute embodying his recommendations for dealing with the problems arising
out of "multiple-firm monopoly or so called oligopoly." The proposed statute,
modelled on the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, was subtitled
"An Act to privide for the deconcentration of certain industrial units for the
maintenance and encouragement of effective competition, for the furtherance
of industrial and economic efficiency and for other purposes."'" It would
require corporations controlling "ten per cent or more of the supply of a
good or service* moving in interstate commerce" or with assets in excess of
twenty-five million dollars to register with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. The Commission would hold hearings to ascertain "whether the
interests of the investors and consumers, the public interest and the main-
tenance of effective competition are adversely affected by the corporate
structure of the firm, the firm's position in the industry, and the business
policies and practices pursued by such firm."'" The SEC would be empowered
under the Act to "issue an order dissolving the company into its component
parts or requiring the divestiture thereby or divorcement therefrom of a
portion of such company's assets or securities." However, dissolution, divorce-
ment, or divestiture could be avoided if the company could demonstrate "that
its conduct-though essentially anticompetitive-was nevertheless in the
public interest, because it contributed to technological progress, passed on any
savings in cost to consumers, provided enough capacity to fill consumer
demand and actually utilized such capacity to the fullest, earned a normal
rate of profit as compared with competitive industries, and did not dissipate
resources in the form of wasteful advertising and spurious product differentia-
tion rather than benefiting consumers by price reductions."' 7
11. Id. at 349.
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 353.
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 1600.
16. Id. at 1313.
17. Id. at 1314.
BOOK- REVIEWS
However, monopoly is not the only problem requiring governmental
intervention. The basic problem in the first four industries discussed in
The Structure of American Industry appears to be the exact opposite of
"overwhelming size and entrenchment in strategic position." For example, we
are told that "the existence of high degree of competition does not assure a
desirable state of affairs' 1 8 in agriculture, the country's largest industry; that
"public policy in the bituminous coal industry should recognize that unregulated
private competition has not been successful" ;"9 that "the problems of the
textile industry invite comparison with those of bituminous coal and
agriculture" ;20 and that "the basic problem in residential construction perhaps
is that firms are too small for efficient operation."2' 1 In sharp contrast to
those industries where the maintenance of competition requires reduction or
elimination of size-"horizontal, vertical, conglomerate"-residential construc-
tion, in the words of Professor Adams,2
is an industry which lacks the mass production techniques, the vertical
integration, the efficiency which often accompanies 'rationaliza-
tion'-an industry in short which lacks the prerequisite for pricing its
product attractively enough so as to reach the many layers of un-
tapped demand. Here is an industry whose shortcomings are largely
responsible for the fact that 'one-third of the nation is ill-housed.'
Where the presence of numerous firms make for competitive conditions, the
editor and authors seem to believe that competition has been weighed in the
balance and found wanting.
Unsatisfactory conditions in the industries characterized by "multi-firm
monopoly" are attributed in part to maladjustments existing between such
industries and the rest of the economy. Not even the most drastic proposals
for dealing with "multi-firm monopoly," however, promise to eliminate such
maladjustments. "On purely economic grounds," a co-author of Professor
Adams concludes "there does not appear to be a strong case for reform of
the [highly concentrated] cigarette industry."2 The author of the chapter
on the chemicals industry finds "the growth of big business units has been,
in part, a response to technical imperatives, has resulted in superior efficiency,
and has also in some ways increased competition in the industry. ' 24 The author
of the chapter on the tin can industry fears that the dissolution of two corpora-
tions accounting for over four-fifths of the industry sales "might have un-
desirable repercussions upon competition in related industries. ' 25 With respect
18. P. 61.
19. Ibid.
20. P. 21.
21. P. 108.
22. P. 109.
23. P. 262.
24. P. 221.
25. P. 375.
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to the industry which he studied, Professor Adams writes: "While we must
resign ourselves to the reality that competition in steel can never be as effective
as in wheat or cotton, we may nevertheless expect to achieve a greater degree
thereof than we now have."2 The student of the construction industry, on
the other hand, finds that residential construction suffers from a lack of what
steel and some of the other industries are believed to have too much of-large
scale units and vertical integration.27
Where the line is to be drawn between too much and too little competition
is not clear, either from The Structure of American Industry or from Pro-
fessor Adams' testimony before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power; nor is it clear just what is meant by competition. This term is used
by the several authors to describe widely differing market situations. Professor
Adams' conclusion that "competition in steel can never be as effective as in
wheat or cotton," but may nevertheless be greater than now exists, apparently
involves the use of the term competition in two senses: 1) as a synonym for
less concentration in steel and 2) as descriptive of the market situation in
wheat and cotton wherein the individual producer is powerless to affect market
price. The proposal for a major surgical operation on steel presumably is based
on the assumption that the largest companies in the industry can be trans-
formed into a sufficient number of independent companies to make oligopoly
pricing less likely. Any deconcentration short of this would amount to a
redistribution of assets within the oligopoly without necessarily bringing about
a change in market strategy or price policy. If no firm were permitted to hold
more than say ten per cent of an industry's net capital assets, only two in the
steel industry, U. S. Steel with 28.6 per cent and Bethlehem with 13.4 per
cent, would be adversely affected.2 s The eight firms which presently hold
69.3 per cent of the industry's assets could continue to do so or even increase
their holdings under such a ruling. However desirable this might appear to be
as an alternative to the present situation, such a reduction in concentration
within an oligopoly would still leave us with oligopoly pricing.
The testimony of Professor Adams before the Subcommittee on Mo-
nopoly Power concerning the accelerated trend toward concentration of
26. P. 189.
27. P. 118.
28. FTC, REPORT ON THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODucTIVE FACILITIES, 1947 [TOTAL
MANUFACTURING AND 26 SELECTED INDUSTRIES] 17 (1949). The steel industry, to
paraphrase this report, illustrates "high (though not extreme)" concentration, i.e., an
industry in which sixty per cent of the net assets are controlled by five or six companies,
or about twice as many as in the "extreme" group where sixty per cent control is
attained by not more than three companies.
Data submitted by the United States Steel Corporation to the Subcommittee on
Monopoly Power shows that the company's proportion of all steel ingots produced in the
United States declined from approximately sixty-six per cent in 1901 to thirty-three
per cent in 1949. Hearings before House Subcommittee on Study of Moiopoly Power
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 594 (1949).
BOOK REVIEWS
economic power in recent years and the prevalence of "multi-firm monopoly'"
suggests that it is immaterial whether an industry is dominated by one or
several companies, the reduction in relative importance of an industry leader
being more than made up by the increasing size of other firms within the
oligopoly. The objection to "multi-firm monopoly," in particular industry
domination by the "Big Three's and Big Four's," appears to be based on the
circumstance that the market strategy of each will necessarily be determined
by his estimate of the others' reaction thereto and that the result, "conscious
parallelism," is the same as collusion. This seems to be the obverse of the
position taken by Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the American Column
& Lumber case29 where collusion among producers controlling approximately
one-third of the hardwood business would have been permitted as a desirable
alternative to substantial market control by a single firm. However, both
Brandeis and his present day disciples look to market results, the former
approving cooperative action to achieve results which if undertaken by a
single firm would be unlawful, and the latter favoring dissolution of enter-
prises whose continued existence would perpetuate market results that would
have been illegal if achieved through collusion.
The results of collusion and conspiracy, in the opinion of Professor
Adams, are an inevitable concomitant of a particular type of market structure.
This, coupled with the belief that the restrictive practices with which so many
antitrust suits have been concerned, are "merely superficial symptoms of the
disease," leads him to reject the Sherman Act as an effective instrument for
dealing with the problem of "oligopoly which achieves the purposes and effects
of monopoly."30 The concept of "conscious parallelism" is particularly trouble-
some. "What, for example," he asks in his introduction to the chapter on the
cigarette industry, "is the difference between the common sense meaning of
collusion, on the one hand, and the economics of parallel action in an oligopoly
framework, on the other? Is 'rational' oligopoly behavior tantamount to
illegal conspiracy? If so, is the attack on the conspiracy itself not futile? Fur-
thermore, if conspiracy in the legal sense is merely symptomatic of an oligopo-
listic market structure which confers illegal power, can such a conspiracy be
interpreted as being a deliberate violation of the law ?,,3'
Can it be said that "conspiracy in the legal sense is merely symptomatic
of an oligopolistic market structure which confers illegal power" when the
oligopolistic market structure, as in cigarettes, is the result of the activities of
several combines, each so large that anything it does or refrains from doing
will affect the market price of cigarettes? To be sure, the concept of con-
29. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377- (1921).
30. Hearings before House Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Coln-
inittee on the Judiciary. 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1321, 1324 (1949).
31. P. 232.
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spiracy has been interpreted since the Interstate Circuit case to include "the-
participation of businessmen in a common course of action with knowledge
of the parallel and similar conduct of their competitors." 2  But whether
rational oligopoly behavior may therefore be defined as conscious parallelism
and equated to illegal conspiracy in the absence of formula pricing or other
persuasive evidence of collusion remains to be seen. If the Sherman Act
could be invoked against the most prevalent form of monopoly only upon
proof of conspiracy or predatory practices, it might well be, as Professor
Adams suggests,8 a blunt and ineffective instrument for keeping the channels
of trade and commerce free from monopolistic restraints.
Conspiracy or predatory trade practices have been important elements of
the offense in most antitrust cases, but their presence is not essential to anti-
monopoly action. Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns all monopolizing
or "attempts to monopolize" whether by individuals or groups. Preoccupation
with the legal concept of conspiracy on the part of the enforcement author-
ities and courts, accompanied by comparative neglect of the non-conspiratorial
provisions of Section 2, may well have contributed to the development of close-
knit organizations which have exercised, with impunity, a greater, and more
effective, degree of market control than their component parts could ever have
achieved by agreement. Because rational behavior of a single firm may
contribute to the same market results as the collusive activities of a number
of firms, it does not follow that action under the Sherman Act is dependent
upon a finding of conspiracy in both cases. Since conspiracy to monopolize
is an offense in itself, proof of its presence enables the courts to deal with
"would-be" as well as actual monopolists. 4 The fact that conspiracy may be
32. Statement of Milton Handler, Hearings before House Subcommittee on the Study
of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (1949).
When government counsel in the Investment Bankers case stated that the antitrust charges
would be supported by "proof of a conspiracy which can be inferred by a course of con-
duct," Judge Medina is reported to have commented that the government would have to
prove a real conspiracy and not one that is "phoney, synthetic or imaginary." New York
Times, Feb, 1, 1951, p. 41, col. 2.
33. Hearings before House Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Coin-
mittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 1321, 1324 (1949).
34. The way of the transgressor is hard, whether monopolist or otherwise. Even
if the Antitrust Division overlooks his transgressions, the way of the aspiring monopolist
is beset with difficulties. A monopoly price for his product may be just the incentive
needed to bring a substitute on the market. Aside from statutory monopolies-public
utilities, patents and copyrights--we have had very few private monopolies in the sense
of single sellers. Aluminum, probably the most publicized, began as a patent monopoly.
Alcoa, by various means set forth in the antitrust case, succeeded in maintaining its
position as the sole domestic producer of primary aluminum for a number of decades, but
as aluminum-made products wore out, secondary or scrap aluminum came on the market
in sufficient quantities to depress the price of the primary metal. Meanwhile the de-
velopments in the chemical industry increased the supply of by-product magnesium be-
yond what Alcoa could use as a minor ingredient in aluminum alloys. Thus, an evien
lighter metal became available as a substitute for aluminum, thanks to an increasing
demand for chemicals. And, as if this were not enough, war-time needs for light
metal in quantities greater than the most farsighted management could anticipate, brought
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inferred from a common course of action among a few sellers (as in the
Second American Tobacco case) or that a firm may conspire with a subsidary
(as in the Yellow Cab3" case) to monopolize through controlling successive
stages of manufacture or distribution does not mean that in the absence of
conspiracy the government is powerless to deal "with the fundamental problem
of size-horizontal, vertical, conglomerate."
The Sherman Act is probably a more effective instrument for dealing
with such problems than any administrative agency could possibly be. Under
Professor Adams' proposed deconcentration statute, the. SEC would be pri-
marily concerned with market results. The courts in applying the Sherman Act
also look to market results. The decisions in the Aluminum case"6 and in the
Second American Tobacco case have been hailed as steps toward the adoption
of an economic concept of monopoly.37 Under the Sherman Act, the govern-
ment need not wait until a plannedt monopoly has materialized. For example,
the consolidation of enterprises engaged in earlier or more advanced processes
of manufacture or distribution does not constitute monopolizing in an economic
sense unless, prior to their integration, one or more of the firms was dominant
in the area in which it operated. If, however, such vertical integration is a
step in a plan to monopolize, it may, like any other attempt to monopolize be
attacked under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Nor need the government be
concerned with the difficult problem which Professor Adams envisions for the
SEC-determination of whether an industry is operating efficiently. The
Sherman Act does not distinguish between efficient and inefficient monop-
olists. "The problem of monopoly is," to quote the president of the General
Electric Company, "indisputably covered very fully by the Sherman Act."3
Moreover, as the Twentieth Century Fund's Committee on Cartels and
Monopoly concluded after its study of proposals for bringing antitrust en-
forcement within the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative agency, "the
traditional procedures of anti-trust are more likely than any others to be per-
mitted to do their work." 9
two other large firms into the aluminum industry and a tremendous expansion in mag-
nesium which, emancipated from its by-product state, is now produced for itself alone.
35. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
36. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
37. Mu", GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 175, 177 (1950); STOCKING AND WAT-
KINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 288 et seq. (1951) ; Timberg, Soine Justification
for Divestiture, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 28 (1950) ; The Sherman Act and the Enforce-
inent of Competition, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the
American Economics Association (Dec. 1947).
38. Statement of Charles E. Wilson, Hearings before the House Subcommittee on
Study of Monopoly Power of the Comnmittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1159
(1949).
39. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 560 (1951). The
Committee suggests, at p. 553, that the Sherman Act "might be amended to establish a
rebutable presumption that concentration exceeding a specified percentage of the market
for any product, or related group of products, was prejudicial to the public interest."
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Whether one thinks political advantages associated with small-scale pro-
duction would warrant a sacrifice in efficiency, if necessary, 40 it is unlikely
that any conscious sacrifice in efficiency would be tolerated. In times of crises
we are reluctant to make changes and doubts are being expressed as to whether
we will emerge from crises in our time. During World War II, antitrust
prosecutions were deferred on the ground that they might interfere with the
war effort. And now the Defense Act of 1950 provides for industry coopera-
tion with the approval of the Government.
The Structure 6f American Industry focusses attention on problems with
which economists, lawyers and public-policy makers are increasingly re-
quired to deal. It attempts to cover too much ground in too few pages,
however, to be much of a guide to public policy formation either directly or
through the intelligent laymen and students of economics and business
administration to whom it is addressed. The timeliness and importance of its
subject matter is attested by the activities of the Subcommittee on Study of
Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
sentatives as well as by the Twentieth Century Fund's report on Monopoly
and Free Enterprise.41 It may be useful as an introduction to the study of
industrial organization.
The interest in industrial organization on the part of economists, lawyers
and public officials has grown apace since the world economic depression.
Much has been written since 1934 when the Cabinet Committee on Price Policy
noted the paucity of, and stressed the need for relevant materials for use in
the foriulation of public policy.42 In addition to the materials made avail-
able by the TNEC and government agencies, a number of book-length industry
studies and a greater number of articles on almost every phase of industrial
organization have been published. None of them are all-purpose works,
useful in their entirety to public-policy makers as well as to teachers of law and
economics. So far as the teaching of law is concerned, the following observa-
tion of Professor Oppenheim is apt: "Whatever approach may be taken, it is
40. "True, it might have been thought adequate to condemn only those monopolies
which could not show that they had exercised the highest possible ingenuity, had adopted
every possible economy, had anticipated every conceivable improvement, stimulated every
possible demand. No doubt, that would be one way of dealing with the matter, although
it would imply constant scrutiny and constant supervision, such as courts are unable to
provide. Be that as it may, that was not the way Congress chose; it did not condone
'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbade all. Moreover, in so doing it was not
necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect
social or moral effect to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his
success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged
must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we have suggested only
as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have been in fact its
purposes." Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (1947).
41. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 596 (1951).
42. HAMILTON, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES vii (1938).
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clear that in the last analysis the interested student should be encouraged to
undertake individual inquiries into selected aspects of the allied social science
material so that the structure of American industry may be better understood
in dealing with the strictly legal aspects of the cases."14 3 Knowledge of sources
on industry data and facility in using them has become almost indispensable
for lawyers in the field of trade regulation. Preparation of an antitrust brief,
for example, often involves summarizing and analyzing the salient character-
istics of an industry in terms of its products and their uses, the relative
concentration of its productive facilities (financially, technologically, and
geographically), and the principal factors in its structure, organization, and
trade practices which may explain its "competitive" or "noncompetitive" char-
acter (e.g., technology, patents, marketing arrangements, relationship to prin-
cipal raw material sources). Recognizing the lawyer's special need for
knowledge of the basic facts of our industrial order, the 1948 Committee on
Auxiliary Business and Social Materials of the Association of American Law
Schools organized an editorial group to assemble such materials for use in
courses on trade regulation.4 4 After preliminary investigation disclosed a "sur-
prising dearth" of suitable information, the Trade Regulation Editorial Group
sponsored a series of industry studies which it is hoped will in part meet the
need for economic data for use in connection with classroom discussion of the
cases. A book such as the Structure of American Industry might well meet
this need by doing a more thorough job on a smaller number of industries and
devoting more attention to economic analysis. Professor Adams' "kaleido-
scopic view of American business enterprise" however superior it may be to
other collected industry studies still requires considerable supplementation.
NORMAN BURSLERf
SECURITY, LOYALTY & SCIENCE. By Walter Gellhorn. Ithaca: The
Cornell University Press, 1950. Pp. x, 300. $3.00.
Professor Gellhorn's volume is the first in a series dealing with civil
liberties and security, to be published under the auspices of a group headed by
Professor Cushman of Cornell. Subsequent volumes will include one on
the House Committee on Un-American Activities and one devoted to the
President's Loyalty Program.
43. OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 82 (1948). This method
been followed since 1946 at the University of Chicago by Dean Levi in his classes in the
Law of Competition and Monopoly. Each student is required to make a study of some
industry or segment of an industry involved in an effort to explain industry behavior
and evaluate the effects of. judicial solutions of what are essentially economic problems.
44. HANDBOOK, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 1370138 (1949).
' Assistant Professor, University of Chicago School of Law.
